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Impossibility and Related Excuses
by
Victor P. Goldberg *

0. Introduction

If conditions change after parties enter into a contract, one of them might want
to be excused from performance, or at least have its obligations revised. Anglo-

American law provides the disadvantaged party with a number of defenses
which would extinguish that party's obligations - impossibility, frustration,
impracticability, and mutual mistake. Although there are some technical distinctions between these, for analytical convenience I will hereafter lump them

all together under the impossibility rubric. My purpose in this essay is to
explore some problems that have arisen in determining the appropriate scope
of the impossibility defense.
The importance of the impossibility defense is circumscribed by the ability of
the parties to contract around the law. If the law were too liberal in excusing

performance, the parties could narrow the range of acceptable excuses by
explicit contractual language. Conversely, if the law were too niggardly, the
parties could enumerate additional circumstances that would justify discharge

of the contractual obligations. If the law were badly out of line in either
direction, the problems could be vitiated by proper drafting of force majeure

clauses. Such clauses, which are very common, will suspend or disscharge a
promisor's obligations for "acts of God". *

* Part of the research for this paper was conducted while the author was a visiting
professor at Washington University (St. Louis) and Columbia University. Helpful comments were provided by Christopher Bruce, Janis Powell, and participants at workshops
at Washington University, Columbia University, and the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin,
as well as by participants at the Conference.
1 Most of the acts of God that are enumerated in such clauses are beyond the control
of the contracting parties. There is one significant exception to this generalization. The
clauses typically include strikes by the employees of either party. The purpose of this
strike exception is, clearly, to protect the contracting parties from the threat of hold up
in their dealings with labor. Thus, in the absence of such a clause the possibility that a

firm would be liable for damages for breach of contract would weaken its bargaining
position vis a vis the union.

This content downloaded from 128.59.178.73 on Wed, 26 Sep 2018 20:08:17 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

144/1 (1988) Impossibility and Related Excuses 101
Indeed, it should not really matter whether we frame the problem

in terms of implementing the parties' decision ("Does the fire constit
of God that excuses performance as per the initial agreement?") or of

ing the conditions that would justify excusing performance ("Do
make performance impossible?"). Even if a contract had no for

clause, a court might infer that the parties would have included on
thought of it. 2 That is, instead of recognizing an impossibility def
courts could achieve the same result by interpretation of a force maj
express or implied.
Regardless of how the doctrine is labelled, courts, when consideri
to excuse performance, should be constrained by the fundamental q
what would the parties have chosen? I will argue that, as a general ru
would not agree to excuse performance because of changed market
(neither supply nor demand shocks). The fact that market prices ha
or tripled would be irrelevant. 3 Parties are more likely to excuse per
if the supervening events adversely effect the costs of performing th
contract for reasons that are essentially unrelated to overall market
This argument implies that relative risk aversion as such has noth
with the question. Analyses which center on this concept - Perloff
Polinksy [1987] - would be largely beside the point. Other analyses i
relative risk aversion plays a less central role - Posner and Rosenfie
Joskow [1977], Bruce [1982], and Narasimhan [1986] - are, to a lesser
similarly tainted.
The paper is organized as follows. In the first section I present an e
of why reasonable businessmen would choose to excuse performance
changed circumstances, but not others. In the remainder of the pap

analyze specific problems that have arisen in the impossibility c

literature. The explanation forwarded in Section 1 will play a promi
in much ofthat discussion. Largely because their paper stimulated my
on the problem, I will contrast my analysis of some of the specific c

2 Posner and rosenfield [1977, p. 107] provide an example of such creativ
tation in an impossibility decision. In Snipes Mountain Co. v. Benz Bros

Wash. 334, 298 P. 714 (1931), the contract was for delivery of a crop that wa

prior to delivery. The contract did not mention that the crop should be
specific piece of land. Nonetheless, the court allowed an equitable action to
contract so that the land was mentioned. The court then discharged the c

a discussion of why courts discharge contracts for crops grown on specific la
Section 2.2) It would have been just as easy to say: despite the fact that there
majeure clause in the contract, we presume that the parties meant to include

such a clause would have excused performance.

J 1 his is not to say that parties would never adjust the contract price, f rice

in the face of changed market conditions are commonplace. But the gran
concession often expects a quid pro quo, either express (e.g., an increase in
the contract) or implied (e.g., enhanced good will). The grantor, that is, m
right to make (or not make) price concessions.
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of Posner and Rosenfield [1977]. I will not,
law, the reasoning underlying the case law,

1. Why Excuse Performance?

Many contracts include a force majeure clau
obligation if, for example, his factory were
to deliver for other reasons, perhaps becaus
where, he would not be excused. Why would
excuse performance for the first reason but
first that not all contracts would discharge
first situation. If the subject matter of the c
would be less likely to provide for discharg
agrees to pay $ 1000 for an item. His wallet
flames. It is unlikely that the parties would
this ground since there is no reason to pres
in any way with performance of this contr
Smith poorer, but does not otherwise impair
He simply substitutes other dollars for those
cash, Smith had lost a ton of a fungible comm
that fungible commodity had burnt down,

need to produce the commodity; he can m
buying it on the open market.

Let us consider, then, a contract for del

fungible commodity from the seller, Smith,
does not perform and remains liable for dam
damages and ascertain the reasonableness of
some of the same problems that arise with m
Because the good is not fungible, the buyer
goods with which to cover. If Brown bears
to choose the most efficient substitute. If, h

Brown's incentive to economize is weaker. F
was purchasing a computer system. His cho
system that Smith had promised include on
hardware and somewhat inferior software and aftersale services. A second

alternative has the opposite features and is considerably more expensive. If
Brown had to pay out of his own pocket, he would choose the superior hardware at the lower price. If, however, the costs were to be borne by Smith, Brown
would choose the latter.

4 As Posner and Rosenfield [1977, p. 118] suggest, the decisions are often more
satisfactory than the justifications.
3 A common ground for denying a request for specific performance is that supervision

or enforcement would be difficult; see Farnsworth [1982, p. 822].
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This is a routine moral hazard problem. The greater the moral haz

greater the joint costs of the parties. It might appear that non-disch
be good for Brown - he receives more than he initially bargained for.
would be correct if we begin the analysis at the time at which Smith
able to perform, it is not correct if we begin at the contract form
Since in the long run the sellers must cover their costs, the costs of m
will be reflected in the price of the goods. In this indirect way do
share in the costs.

If not excusing the seller would result in these increased costs, why would
flush right contracting parties ever fail to excuse? The reason is that there are
benefits from holding sellers to agreements. While these benefits will generally
outweigh the costs, they are likely to be much lower in the event of the occurrence of a condition covered by a. force majeure clause. If the plant for building
a particular machine burns down or a farmer's entire carrot crop is destroyed,
the overall market conditions do not change, although the costs of the individual producer do. If the occurrence of the particular event is uncorrelated with
market conditions, then the expected value of the change in price between the
date of contract formation and the date of the occurrence is zero. If the seller

were excused, the buyer would gain when the market price fell and lose when
it rose; leaving consequential damages aside, those two effects should roughly

wash out. 6 That is, the buyer's expected damages from this source at the
contract formation stage are low. The actual damages could turn out to be very
high, however. 7
The crucial point is this. If the occurrence of & force majeure condition is not
correlated with market conditions, the expected change in market price is zero,

and therefore, the benefits anticipated at the contract formation stage from
holding the promisor liable are likely to be low. However, if the seller refuses
to perform because events subsequent to the formation of the contract have
shown that the contract price is too low, the buyer does suffer. If the seller could

perform, but would prefer not to, we can reasonably infer that the reason is that
the contract price is too low; the seller could do better selling elsewhere. The

changed conditions affect the market for the good or service involved. There is
a widespread drought, the Suez Canal closes, etc. Discharging the contract in
this instance carries a greater cost. If a seller could be excused simply because
the contract price was below the market price, the substantial benefits from
6 If the buyer could have recovered consequential damages that would arise because
a substitute performance could not be completed until after the original performance was
due, then discharge could be expensive for the buyer. The analysis is cleaner where it is

clear that consequential damages would not be granted. When damages from delay are
anticipated, a force majeure clause would be likely to suspend the seller's obligation,

rather than terminate it.

' One cost of excusing performance is that the existence of ajorce majeure condition
is a question of fact which could be costly to litigate. The greater the contract versus
market differential, the greater the incentive to allege the existence of such a condition.
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entering into a contract in a timely mann
might be acceptable in some cases, it is cle
performance when the contract price is t
performance in the event of a fire or oth
Thus, it is at least plausible that contract
excuse a seller in the event of a fire or sim
on other grounds. It should be emphasize
seller to get off scot-free. If a fire destro
is discharged, it still bears all the costs of

risk of a subsequent price change and a

also be noted that the "impossibility" label
for the seller to perform what had been p
him to pay the expectation damages. All h
justification for discharge is that the expec

formation stage is likely to be low com
holding the seller liable.

2. The Cases

In the remainder of the paper, I want to consider four problems discussed by
Posner and Rosenfield. While we generally agree on the outcomes, we differ on
the rationale. I rely on the analysis in the previous section to determine whether
performance should be excused in three of the cases. The one exception is the
Coronation cases which are most usefully analyzed as option contracts. The one

outcome on which I part company with both Posner and Rosenfield and
modern Anglo-American law is not a matter of whether performance should be
excused. Rather, it concerns problems that arise if performance is excused restitution of payments made by the buyer and compensation for costs incurred
by the seller in reliance on the contact.
2.Í The Suez Cases

In 1956 and again in 1967, military operations in the Middle East closed
Suez Canal to shipping traffic. Parties that had entered into contracts before

canal was closed found that completing performance would be consider

more expensive. Carriers and sellers who had promised to deliver goods at
fixed price attempted to avoid their contractual obligations. In most instan
the courts enforced the contracts. In Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. Unit
States, 8 for example, a shipowner argued that its contract with the Unite
States to transport wheat from the U.S. to Iran was discharged by the clos

8 363F.2d312(D.C. Cir. 1966).
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of the Suez Canal. Posner and Rosenfield [1977, pp. 103-105] arg
court's refusal to discharge the contract was correct:

. . . [T]he decision on whether to discharge the contract turn[s] on an examin
key economic parameters that we have identified. The shipowner is the su

bearer because he is better able to estimate the magnitude of the loss (a funct

and of the value and nature of the cargo, which are also known to the shi

the probability of the unexpected event. Furthermore, shipowners who own
and are engaged in shipping along several different routes can spread the ris
on any particular route without purchasing market insurance or forcing thei
ers to diversify their common-stock portfolios. And the shipping compan
desired, purchase in a single transaction market insurance covering multiple

course, the shipper in the particular case - the United States Governmen

diversified too, but decision should (and here did) turn on the characteristic

as a class, if an unduly particularistic analysis is to be avoided.

Perusal of current shipping contracts indicates that the basic ship
contracts were not altered after the Suez decisions. Closing of the C
an enumerated excuse in force majeure clauses. Hence, it would appe

courts got it right. The Posner-Rosenfield explanation, howeve

work. To see this, consider a closely related problem. How would th
a shipping contract deal with the possibility that the port of destina

be closed by a blockade? The reasons given in the previous parag

apply at least as well to this problem. Nevertheless, ocean shipping
routinely include language that would discharge the carrier in this
Why would the parties agree to excuse the carrier in the event of
of the port of destination, but not excuse in the event that the Su
blockaded? To make the analysis even crisper, suppose that in both
these are executory contracts. That is, the parties entered into the
before the supervening event had occurred, but had not loaded the
the ship. Consider first the blockade of the single port. The costs of
goods to the original destination increase. If the carrier were to att
deliver by sea it incurs the increased risk of loss due to destruction
or cargo. If it attempted to get the goods to the port by other mean

over land or substituting other goods for the goods named in t
contract) it would also incur additional costs. It is not at all cle

promisee would want these additional costs to be incurred if it had
costs out of its own pocket. Discharging the contract puts that que
promisee directly. The supervening event raises the costs of perfor
particular contract. But there is no reason to believe that there wo
effect on the market price of ocean shipping generally. This is a clas

of the case discussed in the previous section in which the occu

supervening event is uncorrelated with market conditions. Since at t
formation stage the expected change in the market price of shippi
due to the blockade of a destination port is approximately zero, the

holding the promisor liable should be low.
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This is not true for the closing of the Suez. Th
substantial impact on the market price for ocea
a large increase in the short-term demand for
when coupled with the short-term inelasticity o
prices more than doubling. The fact that the jou
than originally anticipated is irrelevant. The key
cost of the ship has increased. Excusing the pro
supervening event is correlated with market cond
both parties.
It is worth noting in passing that the non-discharge of the contracts does not
mean that all the contracts will be performed. The changed circumstances do
not affect all shippers equally. There will be a reallocation of shipping services
with the ships tending to go to the highest bidders. Non-discharge means that

the beneficiaries of the windfall are those who happened to sign contracts
before the Canal closing was anticipated. Discharge would give the windfall to
the owners of the vessels.

2.2 Agricultural Goods
Suppose a farmer promises to deliver carrots. The crop is destroyed by a flood
and the farmer asks that the contractual obligation be discharged. The general
rule has been that if the contract called for delivery of crops from this particular
farm, then the farmer would be excused. Otherwise, he would not. Posner and
Rosenfield [1977, pp. 106-107] suggest that the explicit identification of the
crops with a particular plot of land is irrelevant by itself; however, it generally
leads to the right decision since it serves as a proxy for the distinction between
a farmer and a wholesaler, the latter being better able to diversify risks.
The result is both consistent and efficient; it places the risk of extreme weather conditions

on the superior risk bearer. The purchaser from the grower can reduce the risk of adverse

weather by diversifying his purchases geographically; there is empirical evidence to
suggest that in some climatic regions geographical separation of only a few miles can
dramatically reduce the risk of a large loss. When the seller is a wholesaler or large dealer

there is no reason to allow discharge since he can diversify his purchases and thereby
eliminate the risk of adverse weather.

To see why the seller's ability to diversify is not the critical factor, let us
assume initially that the farmer is producing a homogeneous product. (This

assumption is implicit in the Posner-Rosenfield analysis; as we shall see, a
proper resolution of the matter requires that we drop the assumption.) If his
crop were destroyed, he could purchase a substitute on the open market and
meet his obligations in that way. Regardless of whether or not he is excused,
the farmer bears the entire risk of the destruction of his crop. The impossibility
defense only concerns the additional risk of a price rise occurring between the
time the contract was entered into and when performance was due. If the farmer
had assumed this risk in the initial contract, why should the risk be shifted when
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his crop was destroyed?9 Why should the parties distinguish betwe
in which the farmer produces the goods and then must sell them at
price less than the market price and the case in which the farmer fail
the goods and must buy them on the market at a high price and re
contract price?
Posner und Rosenfield have concentrated on the wrong factor. Dif

attitudes toward risk do not explain why performance is more l

excused when the contract specifies the land on which the crop is to

A simple question to ask is: why would a contract specify that t

produced on a particular piece of land? A plausible answer would be
parties are doing this to distinguish the crop from others. That is,
not homogeneous ; by specifying that the carrots be grown on a par
of land, the parties are conveying some information about the expec
of the carrots.

My knowledge of agricultural markets is meager and unsystematic, and I do
not want to become embroiled in a debate over the extent of quality variation
in various markets. But I think it is quite clear that quality does vary and that
the identity of the supplier can be quite important in some instances. This is
obviously true for wine grapes. And it is also true for many fruits and vegetables. Indeed, in some instances canners will provide seeds for certain varieties
to selected growers. 10
Thus, if the carrots are destroyed by an act of God and such acts are expected
to be uncorrelated with changes in market prices, we have the type of situation

described in the previous section. The anticipated rewards to holding the
promisor to the contract are low while the costs of holding him to the contract
given the difficulties in reckoning damages and evaluating the reasonableness
of the buyer's mitigation (cover) can be high. 1 i
Notice that it is not even necessary for the contract to include an explicit

excuse clause. If the contract quantity depends upon the amount actually
grown, then any shortfall from the expected crop is automatically excused. That
is, if the buyer agrees to take all the carrots produced (or a pro rata share) and

9 Bruce [1982, pp. 331-32] hints at this; his discussion gets bogged down in some

extraneous considerations of insurance.

10 See Flath [1980, p. 183]. In some instances courts might find that, if a grower
breaches, the lack of close substitutes would force the buyer to incur consequential
damages. In Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F. 2d (1948), a grower of a special variety
of carrots (grown from Campbell's seeds) breached his supply contract. The court held
that the carrots were sufficiently unique to merit granting Campbell specific performance.

(Specific performance was denied, however, since the court misunderstood the force
majeure clause and held it unconscionable; the court then argued that a party that
included such a nasty clause in a contract did not deserve specific performance.)
11 The force majeure clause in Campbell v. Wentz did excuse the grower if the carrot
crop was destroyed.
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bad weather results in fifty percent of the cr

in effect, excused from delivering the remain

At the opposite extreme, consider a wholesa
of many farmers and then sells a product of
problem in this instance is trivial. Even if h
meet his obligations by buying and tenderin
having the promisor cover or of reckoning
to be outweighed by the benefits of providin
be enforced. Thus, in this instance it is less l
a force majeure clause in the contract.
When I presented an earlier version of this
uncautiously characterized the preceding argu
In contracts in which the particular supplier'
expect to find force majeure clauses. Where g
available, we should not find the clauses. Pro
ed out that a number of form contracts for
include force majeure clauses, and he graciou
Careful consideration of one of these contra
my argument, so long as the conclusions are
terms. The North American Export Grain A
delivery of fungible grain from an elevator t
contains a number of interesting features. Fi
in the event that the buyer fails to take deliv

over the accuracy of damage measuremen

eliminates the moral hazard problem. Second,

traded like a futures contract rather than

12 In Campbell v. Wentz, Campbell agreed to
twelve tons per acre). The open-ended quantity
Suppose that at harvest time the contract price
marginal cost of harvesting is upward sloping,

underspend in harvesting because he does not fully
be the case if the contract was for a fixed quantit
Consider a farmer whose fields are flooded. He mi
and the amount salvaged will depend upon the am
exceeded the contract price, the farmer has an i
mitigation) and invoke the excuse. If monitoring of
the availability of the excuse can result in the far
the flood because the bulk of the rewards to his s

13 The contract is described in detail in Slabot

14 Clause 18 sets the damages at the difference b
plus daily carrying costs (a blank term to be filled
further expressly agreed that carrying charges as
the nature of liquidated damages and, as such, that
required in substantiation thereof."
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expected, the excuse clause does not apply. 15 Third, the excuse clau
ative only for a few specified causes which make it difficult for the
ship the grain : strikes, exceptional impediments to transportation, a

by governmental authorities. 16 A fire in the seller's warehouse

excuse performance. In sum, the grain contract is consistent with th
have sketched. The contract is not excused under any circumstances i
had not been anticipated. Even if delivery had been anticipated, the c
not excused if fungible grain is destroyed. It would, however, be exc
costs of loading at a particular location increase just as the contract t
the grain would be excused if the port of delivery was closed. 17
2.3 The Coronation Cases

In anticipation of the procession to be held in connection with the coronation

of Edward VII, rooms were rented along the route at high prices. Edward's
appendicitis forced the cancellation of the procession and considerable litiga-

tion ensured. In Krell v. Henry1* it was held that the cancellation of the
procession frustrated the purpose of the contract and that the renter was

discharged from the contract. He did not have to make payments that were due
after the procession had been cancelled. Since he had withdrawn his cross-claim
for restitution of funds already paid before the cancellation, the court did not
have to deal with that issue. In Chandler v. Webster 19 the court ruled that there

could be no recovery for money that had been paid before the cancellation;
furthermore, the renter would be liable for any money due before the cancellation but not yet paid. This result has been subjected to considerable criticism.

Professors Dawson and Harvey [1969, p. 636], for example, state that "the
absurdity of this solution is apparent."
I think that the decisions are not absurd. Before I begin the analysis, I should
point out that the Coronation cases are one-shot deals between amateurs. These

are the sorts of cases that law professors love. One can play a lot of games
attempting to divine how the parties might have dealt with the problem had
they thought about it. There are few constraints upon the imagination. As such,
these are terrible cases on which to build a commercial jurisprudence. There are,
however, many commercial situations in which similar problems arise and in

which it would be possible to observe how parties routinely deal with the
problem. If, for example, the Chicago Cubs lose in the playoffs, hotel reserva-

15 In trade usage, a "circle" is a series of contracts in which each seller is also a buyer
of the same quality goods at the same port in the same time period; each party to the circle

"may agree to forego actual delivery and to participate in a clearing agreement for the
settlement of contract price differences." (Clause 16) See Slabozky [1984, pp. 56-62].
16 Clause 20.

1 7 See the discussion of the Suez cases, above.
18 Π9031 2 K.B. 740.
19 [1904] 1 K.B. 493.
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tions in Chicago for the World Series

would the contract treat the guest's obli

lodge and when the time comes there

discharged? and will I get a refund for a
Krell and Chandler on the assumption th
as reasonable businessmen. This will be a
World Series and ski lodge type of probl

It is useful to view the owner of the
agreeing to make a series of payment
position to exercise or not exercise th

payment he decided that he did not really
would rather see if from a different loc

subsequent payment, thereby allowing th
tion all money that was due prior to the
Krell for performance of the contract. T
not require that the contract be discharg
performed with Henry simply allowing
Now, the contract did not say that Henr
state that, in the event that the coronati
could refuse to make the payment due p
liability. Nonetheless, I think it is reason
would treat the problem if they dealt wit
contemplating a vacation at a popular ski

six months in advance. If she changed
contract was silent on the matter, she

amount. 20 But the contract would proba
lodge would probably ask for a modest in
tional non-refundable deposits at later da
mind, her liability would only be for the

be that she could walk away from her

planned vacation date at a cost of only te
Posner and Rosenfield [1977, pp. 110] ag
discharged because of the lack of snow. T
ability of the contracting parties to diver
less able to diversify the risks than are t
I doubt that the argument is correct since
skiers to book alternate accomodations on
about whether their assertion is correct; t
The contract would most likely include a

20 There are some complications as to whethe
would constitute mitigation of damages or w
lost volume lessor. For analysis of the lost v
Goldberg [1988, Part IV].
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comes clear to the skier that snow conditions will be inadequate, she

paying. There would be neither a breach nor a discharge. The magnitude of
payments made by the skier will depend upon the timing of the decision
popularity of the lodge, and so forth. If the contract did not require tha
skier make any payments prior to showing up, then she would bear no liab
I have not collected any systematic information on how ski lodges, hote
and others handle these problems. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the opt
are routinely sold. Hotels frequently require that someone booking a room

for the first night in advance to assure reservations.21 Restaurants r
charge a price for reservation, although some high-priced restaurants
established a policy of billing no-shows. I am reasonably confident that a
systematic canvassing would show that the use of options is very common
that the judicial disposition of Krell and Chandler is consistent with what
routinely done in the hotel business.
2.4 Customized Machinery

If a contract involves a machine that is to be constructed by the selle

installed in the buyer's factory and that factory is destroyed by fire pri
delivery, the contract would be discharged. The Anglo-American case law
the Uniform Commercial Code both would excuse performance. Force maj

clauses would also generally excuse the performance. There is less agreemen
what should be done after the seller has been excused. Should the seller be
compensated for costs incurred prior to the fire? Should the seller be required
to return payments made by the buyer prior to the fire?
Let us begin with the simplest case. The fire occurred before the seller has
started to perform and the buyer has made no payment. If the buyer was not

excused, for what damages would he be liable? He would be liable for the
change in the market value of the machine between the date at which the

contract was formed and the instant at which he breached. 22 Since the fire at

the buyer's factory is likely to be unrelated to overall market conditions for the
machinery, the expected value of the price change is likely to be zero. By the
argument of the previous section, it is unlikely that the benefits of holding the

promisor to the contract would outweigh the costs. Posner and Rosenfield
[1977, pp. 92-93, 105-106] and Bruce [1982, pp. 330-331] reach a similar

21 Most of my readers have, I suspect, booked hotel reservations over the phone, given
their credit card number, and agreed, in effect, that if they do not show up for any reason,
they are still liable for the cost of a one-night stay. Fewer, I suspect, had an inkling that
this routine practice is in any way related to commercial impracticability and other arcane

corners of contract law.

22 Some courts might hold Β liable for "lost profits" as well. This, I think, would
largely be the result of a misunderstanding of what it means to make the non-breaching
party as well off as it would have been had there been no breach. I develop this point in

Goldberg [1988, Parts III Β and IV].
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conclusion. They note that the seller is g
salvage23 and that courts have correctly
circumstances.

Curiously, Bruce [1982, pp. 323-324] argues that Taylor v. Caldwell1* was
wrongly decided. That case, the "fountainhead of the modern law of impossibility" (Farnsworth [1982, p. 673]) concerned a contract to perform in a music

hall which was destroyed by fire less than a week prior to the scheduled
performance date. But there is no practical distinction between that case and
one in which the fire disrupted a contract for delivery of a machine rather than
the delivery of a service. Bruce emphasizes the incentives for the music hall
owner to control the likelihood of the occurrence of the fire. Note, however,
that the music hall owner bears the direct costs of that fire; it is his music hall

that burns down. The only damage issues in Taylor v. Caldwell concern the
post-contractual change in the price of music hall services and the performer's
reliance costs, consequential damages, and incidental damages. By excusing the
music hall, the decision put the entertainer in exactly the same position as the
manufacturer of machinery in the hypothetical.25
If the fire occurred after the seller had begun to perform, and if only some
of the costs of performance were salvageable, then responsibility for these
additional costs must be assigned. In the absence of specific contractual language, this raises two new damages issues: (a) Should there be restitution of any
payments made by the party invoking the excuse? and (b) Should the innocent

party be compensated for expenditures made in reliance on the contract?
Reliance would include the costs of acquiring inputs necessary for performance
of this contract, costs incurred in performing the contract up to the point at
which the breach occurred, and costs incurred in anticipation that the contract
would be performed (e.g., establishing a network of retailers or initiating an
advertising campaign). 26
Both of these issues present difficulties even in the case in which the buyer's
failure to perform resulted from a deliberate decision on its part rather than an

act of God that was presumably beyond its control. Thus, American courts

23 If the seller has not begun to perform or if salvage value were zero, then the relative

ability to affect salvage would be irrelevant. There is a bit of confusion in the PosnerRosenfield analysis in that, they assume "the machine has no salvage value" (p. 92) and
then argue that the "loss depended not only on the salvage value of the machine if the
fire occurred after its completion but also on its salvage value at various anterior stages."
(p. 93)

24 3 B.&S. 826, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (1863).
25 In the machinery hypothetical the costs of reliance and the consequential and
incidental damages were assumed to be zero. The assumptions are relaxed in the next
Daraeraoh.

26 In a case like Taylor v. Caldwell, the frustrated entertainer might have incurred
travel expenses; he might also have foreclosed alternative employment opportunities for
the period he had been scheduled to perform at the music hall.
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have in some instances ordered restitution to the breaching party of mon

even where the breach was willful, rather than accidental or negligent. 27

if restitution were appropriate in the face of a willful breach, it should

when a contingency beyond either party's control arises. Whether

should award restitution to a willful breacher is a different question. I
reasonable commercial contexts economics and common sense suggest t
answer should be: No. I will return to this shortly,
If the buyer breached, it is not at all clear that the manufacturer wo
compensated for expenses incurred in anticipation of the sales contract
performed. The law does not generally look kindly upon reliance losses

consequential damages. Indeed, I argue elsewhere (Goldberg [1988],
Part III B) that American law has probably become too liberal in compensating

these losses. I will not pursue that argument here. For my purposes it is
sufficient to acknowledge the existence of a tradeoff. On the one hand, compen-

sating the seller weakens his incentives to control costs before the contract is
terminated. 28 On the other hand, a failure to compensate reliance expenditures
might result in the seller's doing too little. How can these competing interests
best be taken into account? A priori, we can't say. The question is too situationspecific. But that means that, to the extent possible, we should leave the balancing decision in the hands of the contracting parties. There are numerous con-

tractual devices by which the seller could achieve some protection of its
reliance. In particular, it could require interim payments from the buyer. The
arrangement could be formalized with progress payments, as they are usually
called, being required as the seller successfully completes particular phases of
the project. If the contract was terminated prematurely (either deliberately or
by an act of God) there would be no need to order restitution or to reckon the
compensable reliance damages. By appropriately phasing their performance,
the parties manage to balance their respective interests and to avoid wasteful
litigation.
The questions of restitution and reliance are, therefore, interrelated. Prepay-

ment should not be viewed as a mere happenstance. In serious commercial
transactions, prepayment is a device for providing some protection of the
reliance interest. 29 If customized goods are involved, phased payment should

27 See Farnsworth [1982, pp. 600-605, 8.14].
28 Posner and Rosenfield [1977, pp. 93] emphasize the seller's control of costs in their
argument that the contract should be discharged in the event of a fire in the buyer's plant.

Implicitly, at least, they are arguing that the relevant damages are reliance damages and
they should be borne by the seller.
That is, of course, not the only purpose. As noted in the discussion of the Coronation cases, prepayment can be an effective way of creating options. Posner and Rosen-

field [1977, p. 116] argue that because there are so many reasons for prepayment we
should not presume that prepayment is related to the possible occurrence of an event
which would result in discharge of the contract. Therefore, they favor a rule which

provides restitution of prepaid money.
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be expected; the more unique the goods, the gre

parties might find any particular contingen

Nonetheless, a sensible rule for them to adopt
of reasons why a particular contract might no
protect one's interests is to assure that at each
rendered and compensation received are not too

ing restitution or attempting an independen

courts undo the balancing of interests achieved
Anglo-American law appears to be moving in t
ler v. Webster, after being subjected to a consid
overturned in England in Fibrosa Spolka Akcyj
Barbour, Ltd. 32 In that case, the Polish plaintif
be manufactured in England and delivered to P
a down payment and the manufacturer had par
when Germany invaded Poland, a condition wh
contract. The House of Lords held that the plain
the down payment, but that the defendant was
the costs it had incurred; that issue, it asserted,
to deal with. Shortly thereafter Parliament pass
Contracts) Act33 which allowed for some recov
The net result of the decision and subsequent l
courts do their job well, they will manage, at c

parties in roughly the same position the par
became involved. That does not seem to be a

3. Concluding Remarks
The first tentative conclusion I want to draw from this exercise is a methodo-

logical one. Because uncertainty over the future is a central element of the
impossibility problem, there is a great temptation to invoke attitudes toward
risk (relative risk aversion) and the ability to diversify risks in analyzing the
problem. I hope that I have demonstrated the fruitlessness of that approach.
This is one more piece of evidence in the case I have been trying to make over

30 Klein [1980] notes that the parties might have rational reasons for having the
benefits and costs diverge over time. If one party can use the threat of imposing high costs
by terminating the contract, the parties might be better off because that threat can be used
to discipline the potential loser. This possibility makes it even less likely that a court could

intelligently determine how much restitution and reliance damages would be appropriate.
J1 On American law, see Restatement Contracts 2d 272 and Farnsworth [1982,

pp. 702-704].
32 1943, A.C. 32.
33 1943, 6&7Geo. 6, c. 40.
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the last few years against relying upon risk aversion to explain most co

behavior or economic institutions generally. 34
The second conclusion is that the distinction between supervening c
stances which affect market conditions and those which affect the costs of

performing this particular contract is the key to understanding the case law and
the decisions of the parties as to when performance should be excused. Market

fluctuations, even beyond the range that reasonable men might have foreseen,
are not a ground for discharging a contract. That does not mean that the parties
will set the price term and accept any subsequent price changes as part of their

bargain. They have a number of devices at their disposal for adjusting the
contract price to changed market conditions - indexing being the most obvious. 35

The third conclusion is that private parties are pretty clever. 36 They do not
use force majeure clauses indiscriminately. As the discussion of the grain contract indicated, the grounds on which a contract would be excused can be nicely
tailored to industry conditions. Moreover, force majeure clauses are only one
aspect of the private response. Business firms can set up their affairs to take into
account the possibility that the contract might be terminated for any reason.
Phasing performance with devices like progress payments can effectively protect the reliance interest of the performing party.
Finally, these points suggest that courts should be cautious when confronted
with demands for discharge or demands for restitution in the event that a

contract has been discharged. This does not mean that courts should never
succumb to the demands. There is room for interpretation of ambiguities in
force majeure clauses and of the intentions of the parties in the absence of such
a clause. This is especially true as we move away from commercial contracts
between repeat players toward contracts between amateurs. Courts should not,

however, take the existence of ambiguities, real or contrived, as license to
remake deals in pursuit of ex post fairness. The preceding analysis suggests the
principles that should be used to fill the gaps in these contracts.

34 See Goldberg [1988]. I am not alone in my aversion to risk aversion for analyzing

institutions; see also Barzel [1982], Klein [1983], p. 370, and Williamson [1987].

i:> In Goldberg [1985, pp. 531 -534], I discuss the benefits of price adjustment and the
mechanisms for achieving it.
36 Actually, individuals might be rather foolish and most people in the industry could
probably not tell us what the excuse clause looked like and why it took the form that it
did. The cleverness is in part that of a few lawyers and in part (I suspect a greater part)
the result of market forces rewarding the good contracts and penalizing the bad.

This content downloaded from 128.59.178.73 on Wed, 26 Sep 2018 20:08:17 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

116 Victor P. Goldberg JJDTTIE
References
Barzel, Y. [1982], "Measurement Costs and the Organization of Markets", Journal of
Law and Economics, 25, 27-48.
Bruce, C. J. [1982], "An Economic Analysis of the Impossibility Doctrine", Journal of
Legal Studies, 11, 311-332.
Dawson, J. P. and Harvey, W. B. [1969], Cases on Contracts and Contract Remedies,
Mineola, N.Y.
Farnsworth, E. A. [19821, Contracts, Boston.
Flath, D. [19801, "The American Can Case", Antitrust Bulletin. 25, 169-193.

Goldberg, V. Ρ [1984], "An Economic Analysis of the Lost-Volume Retail Seller",
Southern California Law Review, 57, 283-298.
-- [1985], "Price Adjustment in Long- Term Contracts", Wisconsin Law Review, 1985,
527-543.

- [1988], Readings in Economic Analysis and the Law of Contracts, Cambridge.

Joskow, P. L. [1977], "Commercial Impossibility, the Uranium Market and the Westing

house Case", Journal of Legal Studies, 6, 119-176.
Klein, B. [1980] "Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair" Contractual Arrang

ments", American Economic Review, 70, 356-362.
- - [1983], "Contracting Costs and Residual Claims: The Separation of Ownership an
Control", Journal of Law and Economics, 26, 367-374.
Narasimhan, S. [1986], "Of Expectations, Incomplete Contracting, and the Barga
Principle", California Law Review, 74, 1123-1202.
Perloff, J. [1981], "The Effects of Breaches of Forward Contracts Due to Unanticipa
Price Changes", Journal of Legal Studies, 10, 221-235.

Posner, R. A. and Rosenfield, A. M, [1977], "Impossibility and Related Doctrines in
Contract Law: An Economic Analysis", Journal of Legal Studies, 6, 83-118.
Polinsky, A. M. [1987], "Fixed Price Versus Spot Price Contracts: A Study in Risk-Allocation", Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 3, 27-46.
Slatbotzky, A. [1984], Grain Contracts and Arbitration, London.
Williamson, O. E. [1987], "Shareholders And Managers: A Risk-Neutral Perspective",
in Coffee, J. C, Lowenstein, L. and Rose-Ackerman (eds.), Knights, Raiders and
Targets: The Impact of the Hostile Takeover, New York.

Professor Victor P. Goldberg
Columbia University
School of Law

435 W. ii 6th Street

New York, Ν. Υ. 10027
U.S.A.

This content downloaded from 128.59.178.73 on Wed, 26 Sep 2018 20:08:17 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

